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Resumen. En el sistema atomista de Epicuro los dioses son seres 
inmortales. Sin embargo, el alma humana es mortal, aunque la mente tenga 
una composición atómica similar a la de los cuerpos de los dioses. El 
capítulo investiga la cuestión de por qué los dioses son inmortales, mientras 
que el alma humana no puede ser inmortal. La inmortalidad de los dioses se 
debe al principio supra-atómico de isonomia que requiere la proporción de 
seres inmortales y mortales. El alma humana no puede ser inmortal 
probablemente porque la memoria de las imperfecciones de la vida terrenal 
sería eventualmente perjudicial a la integridad del alma. 
Summary. In the atomistic system of Epicurus, the gods are immortal 
beings. However, the human soul is mortal, although the mind has a 
similar atomic composition as the gods’ bodies. The chapter investigates 
the problem why the gods are immortal and the human soul cannot be 
immortal. The immortality of the gods is due to the supra-atomic isonomia 
principle which requires even proportion of immortal and mortal beings. 
The human soul cannot be immortal probably because the memory of 
imperfections of earthly life would eventually be detrimental to the 
integrity of the soul. 
Palabras clave: Epicuro, atomismo, escatología, inmortalidad, alma. 
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Epicurus, a philosophical heir of the atomists, viewed everything in the 
world as composed of atoms which freely float in the void. The soul is no different. 
 
1 
The soul is a body composed of fine atoms spread throughout the entire 
body and is comparable to breath (πνεῦµα) saturated with heat. The mind is one 
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part of the soul composed of particularly fine atoms (DL 10.63).1 This can be taken 
to mean that the soul is composed of three types of atoms: breath atoms, heat 
atoms, and mind atoms.2 In addition to these three types, Lucretius also mentioned 
air atoms (L 3.234, 269). Four types of soul atoms are also mentioned by Aetius 
4.3.11: a nameless type responsible for sensation, air atoms for rest, heat atoms for 
the apparent heat of the body, and breath atoms for motion. The nameless type is 
responsible not only for sensation but also, according to Plutarch, for judgment, 
memory, love, and hate (Adv. Col. 1118e). Atoms of this nameless type are in the 
deepest, innermost part the body, where they form, as it were, the soul of the soul 
(L 3.273-275). This soul of the soul can be identified with the rational part (τὸ 
λογικόόν) of the soul that is located in the chest (DL 10.66); the rational part is the 
mind (animus, mens, L 3.139-140), the directing and governing principle that 
“rules over the entire body” (L 3.138, 281). The irrational part (τὸ ἄλογον, DL 
10.66), which is spirit (anima),3 is spread throughout the body and serves as the 
sensory system (L 3.370-380). The rational and irrational parts together form a 
union (una natura) that cannot be separated (L 3.136-137). 
The soul atoms are smooth, fine, round atoms that are different from fire 
atoms (DL 10.66; L 3.179, 186-187, 190, 205, 244, 425-426). The soul atoms are 
so small and fine they are virtually weightless (L 3.230), so that, when the soul 
leaves the body after death, there is no appreciable decrease of the weight of the 
body (L 3.208-214). However, in spite of such a difference in weight between the 
soul and body, the soul is the principle of life and the principle of motion of the 
body. 
The soul is also the cognitive principle. It is responsible for sensory 
perception in which it is supported by the sensory organs of the body (DL 10.63-
64). The body serves as a protective container, and, in separation from the body, 
the soul could not sense anything (DL 10.66). The bodily sensory organs need the 
animating force of the soul to fulfill their role, and, without the soul, the body 
cannot have sensation (DL 10.65). Thus, the body and soul form a union, and, in 
separation, their functionality is lost.4 
                                                           
1 Abbreviations used: DL – Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, L – Lucretius, De 
rerum naturae, ND – Cicero, De natura deorum. 
2 J.M. Rist, 1972, Epicurus: an introduction, Cambridge, p. 75; the problem of parts of the 
soul is discussed by G.B. Kerferd, 1971, “Epicurus’ doctrine of the soul”, Phronesis 16, pp. 80-
96. 
3 Lucretius also referred to the entire soul – the union of the rational and irrational parts – 
as anima (L 3.421-424); J. Annas, 1992, Hellenistic philosophy of mind, Berkeley, pp. 145, 147.  
4 Annas, 1992, p. 149. 
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All sensation can be reduced to touch since “touch, only touch, faithful to 
us in each moment through the sense of the body” brings sensory information (L 
2.434-435). Seeing consists in the εἴδωλα – thin atomic skins emitted constantly by 
objects of perception to the eye, that is, the eidola strike or touch the eye which, as 
any other body part, comprises soul atoms, and, through these atoms, perception is 
transmitted to the mind. Upon the contact of atoms coming from an object – the 
eidola in the case of sight – a presentation (φαντασίία) arises. Epicurus spoke about 
the perceptions of sense organs and of the mind (διάάνοια, DL 10.38, 51), thereby 
putting the mind and sensory perception on the same level and thus seeing the 
operations of the mind as a kind of touch. 
Sense perception is irrational and has no memory (DL 10.31). Reason is 
completely dependent on sensations, and all thoughts (ἐπίίνοιαι) are derived from 
them by coincidence, by analogy, by comparison, and by combination with a little 
help of reasoning (DL 10.32). That is, “it is necessary to judge the imperceptible 
(ἄδηλον) by reasoning (λογισµόός) in accordance with perception” (DL 10.39). 
Reasoning makes certain assertions about things inaccessible to the senses and must 
establish compatibility (agreement) between the imperceptible and the observable 
phenomena.5 
 Because the soul forms a union with the body, it meets the fate of the body, 
which is death. The soul cannot exist independently outside the body (L 3.788-789 
= 5.132-133), and, when the body dies, the soul must die with it (L 3.417-418, 798-
799; Aetius 4.7.4). The soul is simply mortal by nature (L 3.831) and dissolves in 
the air after death (L 3.455-465).  
To show that the soul is mortal, Lucretius listed three imperishable things: 
atoms, because they are solid and nothing can penetrate and thus destroy them; the 
void, since no physical contact can affect it; and the totality of things, since there is 
no place where its parts can escape (L 3.806-818 = 5.351-363). Imperishability is 
seemingly limited to single atoms, to the void, and to the world as a whole. All 
atomic compounds eventually disintegrate and perish. However, there is one 
remarkable exception to this rule, an exception that Lucretius curiously did not 
include in his list of three imperishable entities, namely the gods, although elsewhere 
he recognized the gods as immortal. This omission can be attributed to the 
unfinished character of the De rerum naturae, but it is more likely that Lucretius 
felt uneasy with Epicurus’ permission of the existence of some imperishable atomic 
aggregates. Probably for this reason, Lucretius seldom mentioned the gods, as he 
was likely uncertain how to approach the problem of their existence and delayed a 
                                                           
5 E. Asmis, 1984, Epicurus’ scientific method, Ithaca, p. 178. 
A. Drozdek 
ISSN 0213-7674 Myrtia 25, 2010, 43-52 
46 
discussion of the gods’ nature to some more opportune time. In fact, he stated as 
much explicitly by promising such a discussion (L 5.155) but the promise was never 
fulfilled.6 
 How is it possible that the gods are immortal? If such an anomaly is 




The gods are beings who are inaccessible to sensory perception – “subtle is 
the nature of the gods, far removed from the perception of our senses, and with 
difficulty is it seen by a part of the soul [called] the mind” (L 5.148-149). This is 
because they comprise much finer atoms than the atoms composing the irrational 
part of the human soul; they are of a fine nature (tenuis natura), so fine that they 
cannot be perceived by the senses but only by the mind, and even that with some 
difficulty. This perception takes place in dreams and visions, when the eidola of the 
gods pass through the rough structure of the human body and irrational soul to 
reach the mind.7 
The Epicurean gods are anthropomorphic beings (DL 10.139, Aetius 
1.7.34). In particular, they are endowed with voice and form bonds among 
themselves. They breathe, eat, and drink, but require no sleep. They speak in Greek 
or in “something not far different.”8 
For Democritus, the gods were not immortal, only difficult to destroy 
(B166). However, Epicurus explicitly stated that the gods are imperishable: “first 
believe that a god is an immortal and blessed being” (DL 10.123, 139; Plutarch, De 
def. or. 420e; L 2.646-647). In addition to the three imperishable entities, Lucretius 
also stated that an immortal entity cannot lose anything, in particular, there should 
be no outflow of atoms from it (L 3.517-518), since nothing that changes can be 
immortal (L 3.756). This points to the special status of the gods, who constantly 
emit eidola and yet are immortal, which is also admitted by Lucretius (L 6.76). One 
element that enhances their immortality is their dwelling place. 
The gods live in the intermundia (µετακόόσµια, Hippolytus, Philos. 22.3; 
ND 1.18), the space between individual worlds, where they are exposed to a much 
lesser extent to the motion of atoms as they would in any world. However, as all 
beings in the Epicurean universe, they constantly emit eidola. To maintain the 
                                                           
6 Cf. W. Scott, 1883, “The physical constitution of the Epicurean gods”, Journal of 
Philology 12, p. 226. 
7 DL 10.31, 139; L 4.324-331, 5.148-149, 6.77; ND 1.49. 
8 Philodemus, De dis 3, col. 13.36-14.6, Diels; cf. Sextus Empiricus 9.178. 
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constancy of their existence and their immortality, they rely on “an infinite stream 
of very similar images formed from the innumerable atoms [which] arises and flows 
towards the gods” (ND 1.49). This provides a feeding mechanism for the gods that 
assures proper replenishment of their divine bodies with atoms that replace the 
atoms in the emitted eidola. The incoming eidola apparently come from the 
outside, from the existing world. After these eidola pass through the atmosphere 
and, then, the aethereal region of the stars,9 they are purified leaving the rough 
atoms behind so that only fine atoms remain and are able to get through any 
obstacle. This mechanism has to assure that the gods retain their structure 
throughout their infinite existence, but atoms used for that end are similar (fine and 
round, DL 10.66) to the atoms that constitute the gods.10 This is a remarkable 
mechanism that cannot be explained only in terms of the random motion of atoms. 
It is a macro mechanism level, irreducible to random atom movement. It must rely 
on a nonatomic principle, on a law that creates order out of randomness and 
unpredictability of the swerving motions of atoms. This is the principle of “exact 
balance in all creation – what Epicurus calls isonomia or equal distribution,” 
according to which “if the destructive elements in the world are countless, the forces 
of conservation must likewise be countless” (ND 1.50; L 2.569-576 speaks about the 
“balanced strife” of the motions of destruction and the motions of creation and 
increase). That is, the creative processes of the emergence of new entities balanced 
the destructive processes of perishing and decay. A particular manifestation of the 
isonomia principle is the constant maintenance of the proportion between mortal 
and immortal creatures: “if there is a specific quantity of mortal creatures, the tally 
of immortals is no fewer” (ND, 1.50). That is, the existence of imperishable beings 
is required by a very general proportionality principle. The nature of these beings is 
not determined, but, when the principle is taken on a more specific level, there 
should be as many anthropomorphic immortal gods as the number of mortals 
(humans or – in other worlds – nonhuman rational beings)11; but also, there should 
be at least as many imperishable tree-like entities as the number of currently 
                                                           
9 Cf. the route of the eidola originating in the gods, K. Kleve, 1963, Gnosis theon: die 
Lehre von der natürlichen Gotteserkenntnis in der epikureischen Theologie, Oslo, pp. 51, 55. 
10 Philodemus, De dis 3, col. 10.38-11.2, probably also L 5.1175-1176; cf. J. Kany-Turpin, 
1986, “Les images divines: Cicéron lecteur d’Épicure”, Revue Philosophique de la France et de 
l’Étranger 176, pp. 48, 53-54. “The gods are not like the pond, but like the river,” Scott, 1883, 
p. 217; “their identity must be like that of a river or a waterfall in which the form remains 
though the substance changes,” B. Farrington, 1967, The faith of Epicurus, New York, p. 116. 
11 More dogmatically, “a god exists because it is necessary that there exists in the world 
something outstanding, exceptional, and blessed,” said Epicurus (Lactantius, De ira Dei 9.4; ND 
2.46).  
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growing trees, at least as many imperishable stones as the number of stones in 
existence, etc. (cf. ND 1.109). Moreover, the very general isonomia principle does 
not specify how the immortality of immortal beings should be assured. This is the 
role of a subsidiary law of nature, which guarantees that the emitted divine eidola 
are promptly and regularly replaced by incoming eidola. 
However, a physical mechanism of properly balanced exchange of eidola is 
not sufficient to assure the imperishability of the gods.12 Any trace of destructive 
processes should be removed from their lives. The gods must not be worried about 
anything because “trouble, concern, anger, and favor are incompatible with 
blessedness” (DL 10.77). Undermining their blessedness, i.e., their perfect 
happiness, amounts to an intrusion of a destructive element into their lives; 
undermining their blessedness means the existence of imperfection which, if not 
removed, can have only fatal consequences. And thus, the gods enjoy “immunity 
from burdensome duties” (Cicero, Acad. 2.121), they are free from cares, from 
earthly catastrophes, etc.,13 do not experience any of the suffering found in the 
human world (L 2.646-651), and know total happiness (DL 10.123). They rejoice 
in their wisdom and virtue, assured that they will always enjoy supreme and eternal 
pleasures (ND 1.51). This virtue includes a disinterest in human affairs, or any 
affairs, for that matter. The gods are not concerned with the affairs of this world 
since the state of eternal blessedness and happiness is incompatible with 
preoccupations and worries (DL 10.76-77; Aetius 1.7.7; L 2.646-651), and 
everything in nature is the work of nature itself, with no participation of the gods 
(L 2.1090-1092). In this, Epicurus follows Aristotle and his unperturbed and 
detached unmoved mover that is eternally thinking about its own thinking.14 They 
are self-absorbed beings who cannot have anything to do with human troubles and 
joys. This means, on the positive side, that they are not responsible for human 
unhappiness and do not meddle in human lives (DL 10.139) in the manner of the 
                                                           
12 “In Epicurus’ system, the purely materialist-mechanist explanation is insufficient to 
account for the eternity of the gods,” G. Manolidis, 1987, Die Rolle der Physiologie in der 
Philosophie Epikurs, Frankfurt/M., p. 147. By the use in his theology of the isonomia 
principle, the law of “statistical equilibrium,” Epicurus showed his “metaphysical poverty, the 
powerlessness of empirical philosophy to express the demands of transcendence,” according to J. 
Moreau, 1968, “Épicure et la physique des dieux”, Revue des Études Anciennes 70, p. 294.  
13 Cicero, ND 1.18, De fin. 2.75, De div. 2.40; L 3.19-22. 
14 Cf. B.A.G. Fuller, 1912, “The gods of Epicurus”, The Hibbard Journal 10, p. 901; 
N.W. DeWitt, 1942, “The gods of Epicurus and the canon”, Transactions of the Royal Society 
of Canada 36, series 3, section 2, p. 43; O. Gigon, 1985, “Zur Psychologie Epikurs”, in 
Aspects de la philosophie hellénistique, H. Flashar, O. Gigon (eds.), Vandoeuvres-Genève, p. 
86. 
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Olympian gods. On the negative side, no help can be expected from the gods, since 
any interest by the gods in the human world would compromise their perfection 
and thus their immortal happy existence. What is counted among men as humane 
treatment of those who suffer is not included as a divine virtue which is a virtue of 
cold self-absorption with the interest of maintaining immortal existence. The gods 
experience neither anger nor joy because these emotions could weaken them (DL 
10.139) and spend eternity in indifference to one another and to everything beyond 
the divine sphere. 
Detached from the affairs of the world – of any world – the Epicurean gods 
play no role in the creation of the universe and no role in human life. It would be 
strange, said Lucretius, if beings who enjoy eternal felicity suddenly wanted to 
create a world. Therefore, the regularity of the movement of celestial bodies is not 
the result of the gods’ working (DL 10.97). Also, there is no providence. The gods 
did not prepare the world for the benefit of men (L 5.156-164), as the Stoics 
believed, and everything that happens is eventually the result of chance (Hippolytus, 
Philos. 22.3), unless directed by laws that assure the validity of the isonomia 
principle. In this, the providential aspect of the traditional theology is fused into the 
supra-atomic impersonal laws of nature, while the personal gods are absorbed by 
indifference to anything beyond themselves. 
The eternal perfection of the gods is also assured by their power of 
cognition (ἡ δύύναµις τῆς διαγνώώσεως, Philodemus, De dis fr. 44.16). What this 
cognition and this knowledge is we can only guess. For example, it may include the 
recognition of the imminent world formation. The gods live in the intermundia, but 
this is also a place where new worlds are constantly generated from all kinds of 
atoms. Therefore, there must be initially a large enough concentration of atoms so 
that the entire world can be formed. These atoms could be potentially detrimental 
to the gods and to their fine bodies, so they must move somewhere else to avoid any 
harm.15 However, such a move may include the formation of a mental scenario of 
being harmed or destroyed by a strong stream of crude and large atoms. Even 
forming such a scenario can be disquieting for the blessedness of divine existence 
and, as such, injurious to the immortality of the gods. Therefore, the structure of 
divine knowledge appears to include only positive elements. In particular, in order 
to prevent harm by the incoming stream of atoms, the gods form an image of 
greener pastures, as it were, somewhere else in the intermundia, and move there 
never knowing that they thereby avoid the danger of destruction. The cognitive 
apparatus, emphasized in the sources as the basis of divine immortality, seems to be 
                                                           
15 “The transitory character of worlds threatens the immortality of the gods,” R. 
Philippson, 1916, “Zur epikureischen Götterlehre”, Hermes 51, p. 596. 
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different from human cognition in that it does not allow for negative knowledge, 
automatically filtering out negative elements or transforming them into positive 
ones. The gods are never troubled since they do not have a concept of a trouble, 




Why are human souls not immortal like the gods? Both human souls and 
the gods are made out of atoms, and because the gods can be perceived by the mind, 
at least mind atoms are of the same level of fineness. Epicurus could thus send souls 
to the intermundia to reside there detached from worldly affairs, spending eternity 
in self-centeredness and egotistic preoccupation like the gods. But he did not. 
People’s lives are full of bad events, misfortunes, mishaps, full of suffering 
and unhappiness, sickness and worries about the future (L 3.824-829). Because of 
the fears, worries and pains that fill the soul, the soul is just as mortal as the body (L 
3.459-462). Arguably, people remember more clearly the bad than the good in their 
lives, and the power of the will is hardly sufficient to clear the memory of what one 
would be very glad to forget. Normally, time is the best physician, but, usually, 
more time than people have available in their lives is needed for bad memories to 
completely fade away. Bad memories are disquieting, sometimes to a considerable 
extent; they adversely affect one’s life, wearing people out, not infrequently leading 
to suicide when a bad conscience is particularly bothersome. Among the gods, there 
is no room for bad memories, for disquiet, for a troubled conscience. One condition 
for eternal existence is freedom from trouble. The gods have only happy memories 
since they have always lived far from earthly troubles. They do not even have the 
concept of trouble, they do not know that an infinity of different worlds teeming 
with life – and suffering – exists in the universe. People with their memory simply 
would not last for eternity, since their memory would always impede an untroubled 
happiness. A solution that Epicurus might have proposed is to have death wipe out 
memory altogether, he might have made a death to be the death not only of the 
body but also of the memory that presumably resides in the soul. However, if this 
were the case, what would be the connection between the soul before and after 
death? In what way could the individuality of the dying person be retained? Not by 
the sameness of atoms which constantly come in and flow out. Certainly not by the 
remembrance of the past life, because memory has just been erased (cf. L 3.847-
853). The sameness of individuality would at best be reduced to the sameness of the 
soul’s form before and after death. This could hardly be considered immortality. 
This would be a new existence for the soul after death, with its cleaned up memory, 
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a fresh creation that has nothing to do with the person who just died. This would be 
pseudo-immortality, an immortality hardly deserving its name. This would be a 
pretense of immortality which seemingly Epicurus was unwilling to introduce into 
his system, although it would be perfectly compatible with the immortality of the 
gods. He could have chosen a middle course by requiring, at death, a cleanup of 
memory from what is bad and retaining only what is good. But, many a time, some 
memory is considered to be good when contrasted with a bad memory, although, 
by itself, it could be neutral. Also, it appears that for most people the amount of bad 
memories is larger, sometimes much larger, than the amount of good memories. 
Therefore, the deceased’s soul that comprised only memories would be crippled, 
partial, and imperfectly connected to the soul before death. Could such a soul be 
considered the soul of the same individual, of the same person? Only partially, 
which means, ultimately, no: it is not the same person and thus the immortality 
would also be imperfect. Epicurus might have considered such an immortality 
unworthy of inclusion into his system. 
However, on purely atomistic principles, it is possible to imagine that 
atoms of the same kind that constitute one’s soul and body could occasionally 
cluster together in the future to reconstitute the same person. Lucretius denied such 
a possibility because memory would be erased (L 3.847-861). However, his 
argument is not convincing because memory, as everything else, is caused by a 
configuration of atoms, and thus it may reappear.16 Theoretically, therefore, in the 
Epicurean world, a punctuated immortality – not only of the soul but also of the 
body – is possible. The possibility of such an imperfect immortality is compatible 
with the view of the world of atoms and the void. Whether this would be a great 
consolation for those who want to continue their life after death is debatable. Very 
likely, this would amount to an undesirable immortality because it would almost 
certainly take place in a different surrounding, among different beings in a different 
world, because it also raises the possibility of the concurrent existence of two 
individuals representing the same person, although these individuals would very 
likely be worlds apart. 
Although Epicurus rejected physical immortality, he supported a moral 
immortality of sorts. In his final admonition to Menoeceus he urged him to “live 
like a god among men; for a man living among immortal goods is not at all like a 
mortal living being” (DL 10.135). These immortal goods are the knowledge about 
the universe, which is the Epicurean physics. And thus Epicurus could offer this 
advice: “Remember that you are mortal by nature and one who took a limited time, 
                                                           
16 P. Preuss, 1994, Epicurean ethics: katastematic hedonism, Lewiston, pp. 54-55. 
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[and yet] you ascended through your investigations of nature to the infinite and to 
the eternal and have seen ‘what is, what will be, and what was before’ [Il. 1.70]” 
(Sent. Vat. 10). Equipped with such knowledge, the sage can find refuge in an 
untroubled life, the life in which there is no prospect of physical immortality, and 
thus the fear of the hereafter can disappear.17 Lacking this fear, the sage can say, 
“death is nothing to us” (DL 10.124, 139; L 3.830, 926).18 Epicurus recommended 
that we should remove the desire for immortality by recognizing the irrelevance of 
death to leading happy life (DL 10.124). Happiness does not depend on the length 
of life, and thus a mortal can be as happy as the immortal Zeus (Sent. Vat. 33) and 
infinite time offers the same amount of pleasure as limited time (DL 10.145). Had 
immortal life been possible, the sage would not have gained anything, since his life 
would be as happy and as pleasurable as the life that ends with irrevocable death. 
Therefore, the Epicurean sage is immortal, since he is convinced that “to be 
immortal is to live without thinking death relevant at all to one’s life.”19 However, 
such immortality is based on the mere redefinition of the word, a redefinition that 
removes the most important element from the concept, namely, unending existence. 
Can finite life – as happy and fulfilling as it may be – really be called immortal 
without violating the basic meaning of immortality? Such a life is at best a quasi-
immortal, just as the tenuous bodies of the gods are quasi-bodies and their blood is 
quasi-blood (ND 1.49). Calling a mortal life immortal is well nigh to sophistry and 
offers only false hope to someone seeking true immortality.20 It is difficult to see 
that many people will be moved by such a verbal device and be convinced that death 
is really nothing. Folding eschatology into the earthly life of a sage by the statement 
that immortality really means mortality is a desperate and unconvincing attempt to 
bridge the gap caused by the lack of eschatology in the Epicurean worldview. 
                                                           
17 “Someone who lives in the midst of imperishable goods in no manner resembles a mortal 
being,” J. Brun, 1966, L’Épicurisme, Paris, p. 110. 
18 This statement “is only apparently confident and can in fact easily be turned around” 
‘Only as long as we live, is death present – even though concealed as the mystery of life,’” H. 
Küng, 1984, Eternal life?, Garden City, p. 163 with a quotation from Eberhard Jüngel. 
19 J. Warren, 2000, “Epicurean immortality”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 18, p. 
261. Pleasure of the sage’s soul “is static, wants nothing of time, and is in this sense divine and 
immortal,” D. Konstan, 1973, Some aspects of Epicurean psychology, Leiden, p. 63. Although 
immortality has only “subjective reference” (p. 68), “men may enjoy a divine and immortal 
happiness, if this is properly understood” (p. 69). Thus, the proper understanding is subjective 
and one can define immortality as one wants – and the sage will define it as mortality.  
20 A fact recognized by Warren, 2000, 250. 
